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PRELAUNCH PROCESSING SCIENTIFIC PAYLOADS SINCE 
CHALLENGER; LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE
R. L. Schuilinq
NASA f John F. Kennedy Space Center
INTRODUCTION
The Kennedy Space Center is responsible for processing a large 
number of payloads for integration and launch with the Space 
Shuttle. The processing of unclassified Shuttle mission payloads 
is the responsibility of the KSC Payload Management and Opera- 
tions Directorate and its NASA-McDonnell Douglas personnel.
Each individual STS mission may involve several payload elements 
such as deployable satellites, upperstages, free flying plat- 
forms, scientific instrument carriers, as well as flight support 
equipment. As of this writing, 1990 will see the KSC payload 
processing organizations supporting the launch and/or download of 
fifteen different payload elements on eight separate STS launch- 
es .
The variety of payloads processed and the lack of similarity
among successive mission processing flows provides a rich oppor- 
tunity to utilize the experiences Q'f the past flows to enhance 
the payload processing team's future operational activities. The 
payload processing teams have taken this opportunity to engage, 
therefore, in some effort to retain the corporate knowledge 
acquired on each of the STS missions, and to attempt to collect 
that knowledge in an accessible knowledge base. To that end, a 
"lessons learned 11 effort forms a part of each of the payload 
processing operations.
LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS 
The organization which is charged with the responsibility for the
2-48
actual on-line processing of a particular mission's payloads is 
the "test team" . This team is an ad hoc organization composed of 
KSC NASA and contractor payload processing personnel, orbiter 
personnel involved in payload-relevant activity, resident members 
of the payload developer team, quality, safety, security, and 
other support area representatives. The test team is a forum for 
discussing status, planning, and concerns regarding the particu- 
lar STS mission payload processing. It meets at increasingly 
frequent intervals during the payload prearrival planning and 
daily during the actual payload processing operations.
Following the mission, the test team members meet to conduct a 
lessons learned exercise. The overall thrust of this exercise is 
operational in nature. Forms are provided to the test team mem- 
bers on which problems encountered during the processing opera- 
tion are outlined and the reporting individual proposes a solu- 
tion which would preclude the recurrence of the problem on future 
payload processing flows.
The test team then meets in a special session to review each of 
these concerns. The actual problem is reviewed, causes identi- 
fied, actions to preclude recurrence are identified, and the 
individual lesson learned is incorporated into a database.
MISSIONS SINCE STS-51L
As of the writing date of this paper, there have been seven Space 
Shuttle launches since the post-51L return to flight. Three of 
these have been classified Department of Defense flights. This 
paper deals with the remaining four; STS-26R, STS-29R, STS-30R, 
and STS-30.
The STS-26R mission, launched on September 29, 1988, payload was 
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite TDRS-C and its Inertial 
Upper Stage (IUS)booster. Total KSC processing time was 137 days.
The next mission, STS-29R, consisted of the TDRS-D satellite and 
its IUS booster together with the Space Station Heat Pipe Ad- 
vanced Radiator Element (SHARE) . The TDRS-D was at KSC for 104 
days and Share for 183 days prior to the March 13, 1989 launch.
The STS-30R mission was a planetary probe and consisted of the 
Magellan Venus satellite and its IUS booster. The spacecraft was 
integrated by its developers in an off-line facility and KSC 
processing began at the Vertical Processing Facility (VPF) on 
February 15, 1989. Launch was May 4, 1989 after 93 days of KSC 
payload processing.
The Galileo was powered by two Radioisotope Thermoelectric Gener- 
ator (RTG) Units. Due to the nature of these units, they had to 
be installed on the spacecraft after it was installed in the 
orbiter at the launch pad. This operation required the use of two 
large specially-built platforms. It was determined that a fit 
check of these platforms at the pad, together with an installa-
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tion handling exercise using an RTG simulator would be required. 
Since this mission would be the first to use RTGs on the Shuttle 
and the first use of the platforms, this exercise was treated as 
a separate flow and the lessons learned operation was conducted 
on this operation separately from STS-34. It is also presented 
separately in this paper. The actual exercise took place during 
the period of May 17-22, 1989, although planning had preceded 
the operation for several months.
CATEGORIZATION OF INCIDENTS
The incidents identified in the Lessons Learned process for the 
above missions have been categorized by their primary character- 
istic features. These have fallen into three major categories and 
one minor. The major categories are incidents involving an opera- 
tional, documentation, or hardware feature. A minor area was 
software which was noted on only one STS mission's exercise.
Within these categories, the incidents were subcategorized to 
identify more specific features. These are described and examples 
given in the following section.
OPERATIONAL CATEGORY
Support Required; Incidents displaying this feature were charac- 
terized by the absence or inadequacy of support for some opera- 
tional activity. Example; Parts required to support an STS-26R 
orbiter-payload interface link check were not kitted and avail- 
able for pickup one day prior to the test.
Coordination; The lack of coordination between organizations was 
a feature of over one quarter of the incidents identified. Exam- 
ple; Payload personnel were not notified of a constraint which 
prevented starting the above STS-26R payload-orbiter interface 
link test until just prior to beginning the planned checks.
Planning/Scheduling; Inadequate planning for an operation or 
conflicting scheduling was noted in these incidents. Example 
Periodic recertifications of STS-34 IUS initiator components at a 
vendor site revealed concerns with possible major .impacts to the 
operation due to lack of access to the components following 
spacecraft-booster integration. Had the certification checks been 
scheduled earlier the preintegration access would have been 
available.
Inter-Organizational; Incidents identified in this subcategory 
involved some inter-organizational aspect. Example; During IUS 
testing on STS-34 the IUS took unexpected telemetry hits when the 
orbiter updated its GMT.
Intra-Organizational; Incidents also, in some cases, featured 
intra-organizational aspects. Example; The payload processing 
organization material support group was not advised of an STS-26R 
documented requirement to provide a backup static gun to support 
pad operations
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DOCUMENTATION CATEGORY
Operational Documents: Documents involved were primarily opera- 
tional in nature, rather than test or requirement documents. 
Example: During STS-34 the J-hooks required to support flight 
hardware at the Vertical Processing Facility were not available 
for installation per schedule as they had not been called out in 
the correct document.
Test Documents; This subcategorization involved documents used 
for test activities. Example For the checkout of an STS-26R 
payload-orbiter interface some copies of the test document had 
revision numbers on all pages while other copies had them only on 
the revised pages; leading to confusion as to what was the latest 
document revision.
Requirement Documents; These incidents involved documentation of 
requirements. Example: On STS-26R the cognizant requirements 
document did not include intercommunication system channels for 
the support of mechanical handling operations.
Incorrect/Incomplete; Incidents in this subcategories involved 
documentation with errors or with incomplete sections. These were 
not noted in reviews and were noted only when they caused an 
impact to the activities they controlled. Example; For the STS- 
26R Mission Sequence Test an unexpected ordnance test set timer 
event failure was reported. It was discovered that this could 
occur at any time and future editions of the document were anno- 
tated to indicate possible recurrence.
Not Available: These incidents featured documentation which was 
not available or present when required to support an activity. 
Example: Patching configurations in support of an STS-26R test 
were done incorrectly and the quality control inspector on sta- 
tion did not have a copy of the relevant document.
Improper Use; The use of documentation to control activities 
requires a standardized approach to the use of documentation for 
specific types of tasks. In some instances this approach was not 
followed. Example; During integrated testing on STS-26R the 
problem report paperwork used for trouble shooting was allowed to 
control portions of the operation, rather than using the control- 
ling document. This leads to "nested" problem reports of unrelat- 
ed problems on one report with a lack of trouble shooting and 
operational accountability.
Requirement Unclear; In some cases, although the writer probably 
understood what he meant, the document's ultimate user did not. 
Example; During STS-26R pad operations confusion existed over the 
requirement for hands-on activity to cease when humidity levels 
fell below a given level.
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HARDWARE CATEGORY
Flight Hardware: In several cases the incidents involved actual 
flight hardware. Example; During the STS-30R countdown the Magel- 
lan spacecraft command receiver locked up on S band commands 
meant for the orbiter when the uplink went from low power (2 kw) 
to high power (10 kw) mode. Since Galileo used the same receiver 
this was a concern on both STS-30R and STS-34.
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) ; For those incidents involving 
hardware, the majority involved difficulties with equipment which 
was required to support the prelaunch processing but which was 
not flight equipment itself. Example;The Magellan spacecraft 
power cables were not compatible with KSC facilities and adapter 
cables had to be developed to support Magellan operations.
Facilities: In addition to flight and GSE hardware, in several 
incidents the facility in which the operation was being carried 
out had an impact due to failures or inadequacies of its systems. 
Example; During the STS-34 operations at the VPF an elevator door 
transformer overheated and produced a noticeable odor. As the 
Galileo was loaded with hypergolic fuels at the time any uniden- 
tified odor required evacuating the building and evaluations by 
environmental health sniff checks prior to resuming operations.
Hardware Found to be Damaged: Some hardware elements were found 
to be damaged when they were received for use. Example; During 
the RTG Simulated installation exercise the platform which had 
been developed to support the operation was noted as having 
severe bends on stair treads, indicative of the metal having 
local yielding.
Hardware Damaged by Use; In some cases, the hardware elements 
were damaged by their use. Example; Following a stress corrosion 
modification the J-hooks which would support the STS-34 payload
in the test stand were proofloaded, during which activity the 
adjustment mechanism of the J-hooks was deformed.
Modification Required; In a number of incidents hardware elements 
were found to be undamaged but to require some modification for
their effective usage. Example On STS-29R following cleaning, 
leak checks, and certification of the TDRS propellant facility
fill line, there was no way to verify blanket pressure in the
line without a modification to add a pressure gauge in the line.
SOFTWARE CATEGORY
Incorrect Software; Some software was found to require modifica- 
tion. Example: Starting dates for operations on STS-26R were 
found to be inconsistent between the payload integrated control 
schedule and the open-items status reporting mechanism. A soft- 
ware change was found to be necessary to eliminate this source of 
confusion.
Incorrect Usage; in one case the software's correct usage was not
fully understood by the test personnel. Example; During STS-26R 
testing an unexpected payload data interleaver decom-fail message 
was received although other indications did not support the fact 
of a failure. Later understanding lead to documentation annota- 
tion to explain the cause and note it as not being a problem.
CATEGORIZATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The evaluation of the Lessons Learned incidents by the mission 
test team involved recommendation for the future. The objective 
of these was the avoidance of future repetitions of the same type 
of incident. These recommendations could be characterized by 
certain basic approaches or features. These are described as a 
factor of the relevant incident category for which they were 
developed and examples given as follows.
OPERATIONAL CATEGORY
Admonitory: Recommendations for the future having this character- 
istic were primarily in the forms of warnings and cautionary 
statements. The recommendations state, in effect, "this was an 
error and the action required is to be aware of it and not to 
repeat the error". The action is educational rather than calling 
for a specific activity. Example; During the STS-30 processing a 
backlog of trouble shooting problem reports built up requiring a 
large amount of time to clear the documentation and process paper 
resulting in a request for systems engineers to complete and 
clear their paperwork in a more timely manner.
Modify Documentation ; Recommendations of this type dealt with 
incidents in which the documentation process as such was not the 
causative factor, however by modifying the relevant documentation 
the operation could be enhanced. Example; During the RTG simula- 
tion the developer's GSE was prechecked by KSC quality before 
going to the launch pad. This minimized potential impacts to the 
operation at the pad and was incorporated into the document for 
future simulations and actual RTG installations.
Modify Operation By modifying the operational approach the causa- 
tive factor in these cases could be prevented. Example; Personnel 
performing nonintegrated tasks at the pad on STS-26R did not 
notify the payload pad leader of their presence, activities, or 
problems leading to operational confusion. The recommended action 
was for the payload pad leader to be designated as the main point 
of contact so as to have a coordinated payload operation at all 
times.
Modify Support; In these instances, modifying the character of 
the support was recommended. Example; During the RTG simulation 
malfunctioning communications boxes delayed portions of the 
activity such that the operational support was modified to in- 
clude portable contingency communications boxes as well as a 
preoperational check of those present.
Establish Study Effort; Incidents characterized by this type of
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recommendation were such that the optimal course of approach was 
not immediately apparent. Therefore, it was considered prudent to 
convene a group of personnel to study the situation and to deter- 
mine that approach. Example; During STS-26R it was found that 
photographic support was uncoordinated, in conflict with various 
organizations, and of poor quality. It was determined that a 
working group was required so that the relevant organizations 
could coordinate this activity and establish operating relations.
DOCUMENTATION CATEGORY
Revise the Document; Such incidents required modification to the 
cognizant documentation, its distribution, or its application. 
Example: Some tests, such as orbiter-interface, mission sequence, 
or end-to-end, are performed on successive mission flows. Since 
the document authors tend to clone documents from past flows they 
have to be cautioned to remove inapplicable mission-specific 
items which may be inadvertently included.
Revise Document Review Effort: This approach involved the educa- 
tion of offsite personnel in the method and effort required in 
the review process. Example: The personnel on STS-34 did not 
always fully understand the significance of test and operations 
document reviews and did not always support them with the neces- 
sary individuals such that the review process had to be modified 
at a late date to obtain fully reviewed documents.
HARDWARE CATEGORY
Modify Hardware: The relevant hardware required specific modifi- 
cation to preclude future incidents. Example: On STS-34 a pad 
hoist leaked oil on the spacecraft sunshade and the hoist was 
modified with a diaper arrangement to preclude a recurrence.
Repair Hardware: The damaged hardware required repair. Examples; 
On STS-30R and -34 VPF facility systems broke down and required 
repair before the operations could be resumed.
SOFTWARE CATEGORY
Modify Software; The relevant software required modification. 
Example; On STS-26R a TDRS data drop out occurred due to the 
program having the wrong configuration and the software was 
modified to deal with this.
Modify Software Use In one case the correct usage of the software 
was noted and documentation annotated as described above.
BASIC DATA SET
The tables below provide the basic set of numerical data based 
upon the above characterizations of the incidents and of the 
recommendations. These are provided in both numbers of incidents 
and in the form of percentages.
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STS FLIGHT STS-26R STS-29R STS-30R RTG STS-34 TOTAL 
SIM
LESSONS LEARNED EVALUATED 
PER STS MISSION
116 16 25 37 37 231
TABLE I
Individual Lessons Learned Identified and Evaluated 
as a Function of STS Mission
Table I presents the total "lessons learned" identified by the 
test teams as a function of the individual flows. STS-26R, as the 
first flight in several years, was characterized by the highest 
number of incidents. STS-29R was basically a repetition of STS- 
26R from a payload viewpoint and had the least. The other three 
orocessina ©Derations had roughly similar levels of incidents.
STS FLIGHT
INCIDENT CATEGORIES
OPERATIONAL
Support Required
Coordination
Planning/Scheduling
Inter-Organizational
Intra-Organizational
DOCUMENTATION
Operational Document
Test Document
Requirement Document
Incorrect/Incomplete
Not Available
Improper Use
Requirement Unclear
HARDWARE
Flight
G8E
Facility
Hardware Found Damaged
Hardware Damaged by Use
Modification Required
SOFTWARE
Incorrect Software
Incorrect Usage
STS-26R STS-29R
NUMBE R/ PE RC ENT AG E OF
18/15.5
32/27.6
14/12.1
29/25.0
9/ 7.8
14/12.1
17/14.7
14/12.1
28/24.1
2/1.7
6/5.2
8/6.9
4/3.4
8/6.9
2/1.7
1/1.0
3/2.6
7/6.0
4/3.4
1/1.0
3/18.8
4/25.0
2/12.5
6/37.4
~
5/31.3
-
1/6.3
6/37.4
-
-
""
1/6.3
1/6.3
2/12.5
-
-
3/18.8
-
"
STS-30R
INCIDENTS
7/28.0
6/24.0
5/20.0
2/8.0
-
3/12.0
3/12.0
1/4.0
5/20.0
-
-
~
1/4.0
2/8.0
2/8.0
-
-
3/12.0
-
 *
RTG
SIM
8T8-34 TOTAL
PER MISSION PROCESSING FLOW
4/10.8
5/13.5
3/8.1
5/13.5
1/2.7
13/35.1
-
1/2.7
13/35.1
-
-
1/2.7
-
13/35.1
2/5.4
1/2.7
10/27.0
-
" 
8/21.6
15/40.5
3/8.1
9/24.3
2/5.4
7/18.9
6/16.2
2/5.4
7/18.9
3/8.1
1/2.7
-
2/5.4
2/5.4
1/2.7
1/2.7
1/2.7
-
*"
40/17.3
62/26.8
27/11.7
51/22.0
12/5.2
42/18.2
26/11.3
19/8.2
59/25.2
5/2.2
7/3.0
9/3.9
6/2.6
26/11.3
10/4.3
3/1.3
4/1.7
24/10.4
4/1.7
I/. 4
TABLE II
Numbers and Percentages Per Mission Processing Flow of
Lessons Learned Documented as a Function of Incident
Area for Each Mission Flow and the Total
Table II presents the characteristics of the incidents with 
respect to the individual processing flows for the various cate- 
gories of incident. In addition to the number format, the data is 
also presented in a percentage format for each processing flow. 
It should be noted that some incidents may exhibit two character- 
istics. An incident may also have inter-organizational aspects as 
well as coordination aspects. A documentation incident may have 
operational aspects as well as incomplete aspects. Therefore, the 
numbers of characteristics should not total to the incident total 
in Table I nor should the percentages per mission total to 100.
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STS PLIGHT
INCIDENT CATEGORY 
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
OPERATIONAL 
Admonitory 
Modify Documentation 
Modify Operation 
Modify Support 
Establish Study Effort
DOCUMENTATION 
Revise Document 
Revise Review Effort
HARDWARE 
Modify Hardware 
Repair Hardware
SOFTWARE 
Modify Software 
Revise Software Use
8TS-26R STS-29R STS-30R RTG 
SIM
NUMBER/ PERCENTAGE OP
63/54.3 
9/7.8 
20/17.2 
2/1.7 
11/9.5
27/23.3 
1/1.0
27/6.0 
1/5.2
4/3.4 
1/1.0
9/56.3 
4/25.0
5/31.3
3/18.8
-
MISSION
13/52. 
1/4.0 
11/44. 
1/4.0
4/16. 
1/4.0
4/16.
-
STS-34
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
PROCESSING
0 6/16.2 
2/5.4 
0 5/13.5 
1/2.7 
7/18.9
0 13/35.1
0 11/29.7 
1/2.7
-
FLOW
23/62.2 
3/8.1 
14/37.8 
1/2.7 
1/2.7
5/13.5 
1/2.7
1/2.7 
1/2.7
-
TOTAL
PER
114/49.4 
15/6.5 
54/23.4 
5/2.2 
19/8.2
55/23.8 
2/.9
26/11.3 
6/3.5
4/1.7 
I/. 4
TABLE III
Numbers and Percentages Per Mission Processing Flow of 
Recommended Actions as a Function of Incident Category
Table III provides the numerical and percentage data for the 
recommended actions for each of the STS missions discussed. As 
with the incidents themselves, the recommended actions are cate­ 
gorized in the same three major and one minor (software) areas. 
Also, more than one characteristic may apply to a specific inci­ 
dent's recommendation such that the numerical total per mission 
should not necessarily equal the incident total in Table I nor 
should the percentages total 100 per mission.
OBSERVATIONS
Consistently, the major area flagged by the lessons learned 
process appears to be that of coordination, which was a concern 
in approximately one quarter of the lessons learned incidents. 
Also, the inter-organizational aspect is a far more prevalent 
factor than inter-organizational. Incomplete or incorrect docu- 
mentation is also a major area of concern. Together with coordi- 
nation concerns, these two areas accounted for over half of the 
incidents.
Although they do not form a large number of incidents, it is
noted, that facility systems failures occurred on each mission 
with two failures on each of the missions,
In the recommended actions area it is noteworthy that approxi- 
mately half involved admonitory measures. This would involve
warnings, cautions, or requests to "be advised 11 of the threats in
a number of situations. A concern with such types of remedial
activities is that they are basically heuristic in nature and it 
is difficult to track the results. Also difficult to track are
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the study effort recommendations. No mechanism is set up to track 
these two types of recommendations to determine if they were, or 
are, being followed.
Revisions to documents were flagged in almost a third of the 
incidents noted. As with recommendations to fix something dam- 
aged, this type of action is basically an after-the-fact approach 
rather than preventative.
The lessons learned exercise appears to reinforce the idea that 
operational payload processing is primarily an area where indi- 
viduals 1 experiences on the job and past exposure to operations 
determine how successful they may be in the future. To that end, 
the formal lessons learned process has great potential in educat- 
ing personnel in the subject of payload operations.
The lessons learned process at present, however, suffers from its 
being a non-structured and non-rigorous program. The participa- 
tion of the test team members may be enthusiastic or it may not. 
The main objective of the test team is to process a given mission 
payload and the lessons learned exercise may be considered only 
ancillary. The test team itself is subject to individualistic 
factors and to demands on its time such that the lessons learned 
process may receive much emphasis or little. Also, having com- 
pleted the gathering of lessons learned, the compilation into a 
data base is often of low priority. In addition, little effort to 
analyze the cumulative lessons may be present, on.
It must also be noted that test team personnel are not knowledge- 
able in operations analysis nor statistical research. It may be 
presumptuous to expect them to be as enthusiastic or as effective 
as professional analysts of operational activity might be.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The lessons learned process has the potential of being an ex- 
tremely effective educational tool in payload processing opera- 
tions. The emphasis on individual experience which may be passed 
on through this process and the scarcity of any organized train- 
ing in operations as such, make it a valuable tool if it is 
utilized. At present it does not appear to be utilized - rather 
it is one more task for the test teams to complete. A major 
causative factor in this is simply the lack of contractor or NASA 
personnel resources to carry out effective data collection and 
analysis.
The potential benefits of an effective, consistent, and organized 
evaluation of these experiences, however, suggest that a vigorous 
prosecution of the concept may pay dividends far in excess of the 
cost. This is true especially if trained researchers and analysts 
are involved. It is therefore suggested that a professional 
operations research entity be used in conjunction with the test 
teams to structure, conduct, analyze, and provide the results of 
the payload processing lessons learned program in the future.
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